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THE CRIME OF AMATEURISM
William W. Berry III*
In the fall of 2017, the Department of Justice indicted a series of
individuals—shoe executives, assistant coaches, runners, and financial
advisors—alleging bribery and fraud. What made the actions of these
individuals criminal was that they violated the NCAA’s amateurism
rules, and in doing so, defrauded publicly funded universities of the benefit of an eligible amateur athlete.
NCAA rules have effectively created the crime of violating amateurism rules—a kind of federal amateurism fraud. While not unprecedented,
the scope and extent of the prosecutions in these recent cases open the
door to a novel set of implications for athletics boosters, coaches, and
compliance units within athletic departments.
Having framed the issue, the Article explores the question of the
proper scope of criminal liability in this context, hypothesizing that to
some degree, the universities may not be such significant victims, while
intercollegiate athletes in some contexts can be. The Article then advances its central claim—that the effect of the criminal prosecutions for
violating amateurism rules has been, and will continue to be, a loosening
of the amateurism rules. Further, this shift away from amateurism will
inform the NCAA’s move toward allowing intercollegiate athletes to
profit off of the use of their name, image, and likenesses.
In Part I, the Article introduces NCAA amateurism rules and how
reform may be imminent. Part II describes the recent criminal cases.
Part III presents the theory of amateurism fraud related to intercollegiate athletics. In Part IV raises questions as to the prudence of this increased criminality and challenges the theoretical framing of universities as victims and college athletes as accomplices. In Part V, the Article
explores the immediate and wide-ranging implications of the criminalizing and prosecution of NCAA rule violations. Finally, Part VI argues
that the consequence of the heightened criminality of amateurism fraud
* Montague Professor of Law, University of Mississippi. The author would like to
thank Jordyn Augustus for excellent research assistance, and the Santa Clara Law Review for
their hard work on the article.
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has been and will continue to be a shift away from amateurism by the
NCAA and its member institutions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“There’s sunshine, fresh air, and the team’s behind us. Let’s play
two.” –Ernie Banks1
Chicago Cubs Hall of Fame shortstop Ernie Banks captured the joy
of playing sports with his famous response to a reporter’s question about
an upcoming game; he loved baseball so much that he wanted to play a
doubleheader.2 The rhetoric of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) concerning intercollegiate athletics mirrors Banks’ sentiments. College athletes play for the love of the game, as part of their
education, and in order to further their personal growth, according to the
NCAA narrative.3 A recent advertising campaign—“a day in the life”—
provides a window into the NCAA support of the pristine student-athlete
experience it highlights.4 And the NCAA has long trumpeted its athletes
“going pro” in something besides sports.5
Over the past three decades, the NCAA has endeavored to protect6
its version of amateurism.7 While the NCAA definition has shifted over
1. MLB, Ernie Banks is inducted into Baseball Hall of Fame, YOUTUBE (Jan. 24,
2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bmHETjTb7ks&feature=youtu.be; see also Ernie
Banks, NATIONAL BASEBALL HALL OF FAME AND MUSEUM, https://baseballhall.org/hall-offamers/banks-ernie (last visited Oct. 13, 2020).
2. MLB, supra note 1; see also Ernie Banks, supra note 1; see generally DOUG WILSON,
LET’S PLAY TWO: THE LIFE AND TIME OF ERNIE BANKS xi (2019); RON RAPOPORT, LET’S
PLAY TWO: THE LEGEND OF MR. CUB, THE LIFE OF ERNIE BANKS 141 (2019).
3. See generally NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org (last visited Oct. 19, 2020).
4. See, e.g., NCAA (@NCAA), TWITTER (Mar. 17, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://twitter.com/ncaa/status/1107386124081811457?lang=en (advertisement depicting a “day in the
life” of a student-athlete). These advertisements received widespread criticism, including
from current student-athletes. See, e.g., Kristian Winfield, Former and current student-athletes are calling out this NCAA ‘Day in the life’ video, SBNATION (Mar. 20, 2019, 1:28 PM),
https://www.sbnation.com/college-basketball/2019/3/20/18274327/former-and-current-student-athletes-are-calling-out-this-ncaa-day-in-the-life-video.
5. See, e.g., NCAA, NCAA Student-Athlete Commercial, YOUTUBE (Apr. 2, 2011),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9UzO4DJBoWw; Dan Levy, NCAA Is Looking for a
Marketing Makeover, Here Are Some Terrible Ideas, BLEACHER REP. (Apr. 12, 2012),
https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1143312-ncaa-is-looking-for-a-marketing-makeoverhere-are-some-terrible-ideas.
6. There has been extensive litigation concerning NCAA amateurism rules. See, e.g., In
re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d 1239
(9th Cir. 2020); Deppe v. NCAA, 893 F.3d 498 (7th Cir. 2018); O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802
F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015); Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012); Bloom v. NCAA,
93 P.3d 621 (Colo. App. 2004); NCAA v. Lasege, 53 S.W.3d 77 (Ky. 2001); NCAA v. Smith,
525 U.S. 459 (1999); Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992); Gaines v. NCAA, 746
F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); Bd.
of Regents v. NCAA, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
7. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2019-2020 DIVISION I MANUAL § 2.9
(2019) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL]. The Principle of Amateurism: “Student-athletes shall
be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily
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time, it now includes compensating students for tuition, room, board,
books, and additional funds needed for the cost of attendance.8 On the
horizon, possible broadening of this definition to include other costs related to education seems likely.9
To date, remuneration from third parties, including incidental benefits, has been largely forbidden, although this too seems likely to
change.10 In response to recent litigation and legislation, the NCAA
agreed in the fall of 2019 to allow intercollegiate athletes to receive compensation from third parties for use of the athletes’ name, image, and
likeness, but the exact parameters of such permission, including how the
NCAA plans to regulate such remuneration, remains unclear to date.11 A
recent announcement indicated that the NCAA plans to allow such payments from third parties, not universities, within “guardrails” to be developed by the universities during the 2020-21 year before these new
rules take effect in 2021-22.12 These reforms presumably allow athletes
to hire agents, receive money from their identity as an athlete, but preclude the use of the university’s intellectual property and logos in doing
so.13
In the fall of 2017, the Department of Justice indicted a series of
individuals—shoe executives, assistant coaches, runners, and financial
advisors—alleging bribery and fraud.14 What made the actions of these
individuals criminal was that they violated the NCAA’s amateurism
by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.” Id. NCAA MANUAL, supra, §12
(amateurism section detailing all of the rules restricting third-party benefits).
8. See id. §15.2 (Financial Aid).
9. See discussion infra Part VI; In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-inAid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d at 1265-66 (upholding an injunction restricting the ability
of the NCAA to block “education-related” expenses).
10. See discussion infra Part VI.
11. See Press Release, NCAA, Board of Governors starts process to enhance name, image and likeness opportunities (Oct. 29, 2019), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/news/board-governors-starts-process-enhance-name-image-and-likeness-opportunities.
12. Press Release, NCAA, Board of Governors moves toward allowing student-athlete
compensation
for
endorsements
and
promotions
(Apr.
29,
2020),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/board-governors-moves-toward-allowing-student-athlete-compensation-endorsements-and-promotions.
13. ESPN Staff, Players getting paid? Video games returning? Answering your NCAA
name, image and likeness questions, ESPN (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.espn.com/collegefootball/story/_/id/29113592/players-getting-paid-video-games-returning-answering-yourncaa-name-image-likeness-questions.
14. See generally Cara Cristina Maines & Edward Popovici, Corruption in Basketball:
Understanding United States v. Gatto et. al.: What Comes Next?, CTR. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF PUB. INTEGRITY (Mar. 21, 2019), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/public-integrity/us_v_gatto-what_comes_next.pdf [hereinafter CAPI].
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rules, and in doing so, defrauded publicly-funded universities of the benefit of an eligible amateur athlete.15
NCAA rules have effectively created the crime of violating amateurism rules—a kind of federal amateurism fraud.16 While not unprecedented, the scope and extent of the prosecutions in these recent cases
open the door to a novel set of implications for athletics boosters,
coaches, and compliance units within athletic departments.
This Article explores the question of the proper scope of criminal
liability in this context, hypothesizing that to some degree, the universities may not be such significant victims, while intercollegiate athletes in
some contexts can be. The Article then advances its central claim—that
the effect of the criminal prosecutions for violating amateurism rules has
been, and will continue to be, a loosening of the amateurism rules. Further, this shift away from amateurism will inform the NCAA’s move
toward allowing intercollegiate athletes to profit off of the use of their
name, image, and likenesses.17
In Part II, the Article describes the recent criminal cases. Part III
presents the theory of amateurism fraud related to intercollegiate athletics. Part IV raises questions as to the prudence of this increased criminality and challenges the theoretical framing of universities as victims
and college athletes as accomplices. In Part V, the Article explores the
immediate and wide-ranging implications of the criminalizing and prosecution of NCAA rule violations. Finally, Part VI argues that the consequence of the heightened criminality of amateurism fraud has been and
will continue to be a shift away from amateurism by the NCAA and its
member institutions.
II. THE RECENT COLLEGE BASKETBALL FRAUD CASES
Beginning in 2015, the United States Department of Justice began
investigating possible corruption and fraud in college basketball related
to the compensation of prospective and current intercollegiate athletes.18
This investigation involved court-authorized wiretaps of shoe executives, runners, and coaches.19 In addition, federal agents posed as potential investors interested in funding prospective and current college
15. Id. at 1-2; United States v. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d 336, 336-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
16. See discussion infra Part III.
17. Some have even hypothesized that these developments signal the beginning of the
end for the NCAA itself. Nick Kosko, After likeness ruling, Paul Finebaum thinks NCAA is
going down, 247SPORTS (Apr. 30, 2020, 10:09 AM), https://247sports.com/college/alabama/Article/NCAA-likeness-ruling-student-athlete-compensation-Paul-Finebaum-thinksNCAA-is-going-down-146655600/.
18. See CAPI, supra note 14, at 1.
19. Id.
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basketball players.20 On September 26, 2017, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York announced the arrests of ten individuals across several cases related to payments made in
violation of NCAA rules.21
A. The Shoe Company
The first scheme involved paying prospective college basketball
players to attend college basketball programs that had contracts with
Adidas.22 The indictment alleged that senior Adidas executive James
Gatto, Adidas consultant Merl Code, and aspiring agent Christian Dawkins, conspired to funnel payments to star high school basketball players.23 Adidas would benefit by having the star player wear its shoes and
gear while playing college basketball, and hopefully after graduation.
The aspiring agent would benefit by developing a financial relationship
that would hopefully lead to the representation of the athlete upon graduation.
The Gatto case focused on the allegation that Gatto, Code, and
Dawkins, along with financial advisor Munish Sood, had combined to
secure $100,000 from Adidas to pay the family of Brian “Tug” Bowen
in exchange for Bowen’s commitment to play basketball at the University of Louisville, an Adidas-sponsored school.24 The FBI investigation
discovered that the conspirators funneled the money to Bowen and similar athletes using third parties and non-profit institutions; this practice
included making fake invoices and concealing their payments by using
cash exchanges in remote parking lots.25
At trial, the government concentrated on showing that the defendants “obtained property” as required under the federal fraud statute26
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.; Press Release, United States Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York,
U.S. Attorney Announces The Arrest Of 10 Individuals, Including Four Division I Coaches,
For College Basketball Fraud And Corruption Schemes (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/us-attorney-announces-arrest-10-individuals-including-four-divisioni-coaches-college [hereinafter Arrest].
23. See CAPI, supra note 14, at 1; Arrest, supra note 22.
24. See CAPI, supra note 14, at 2; Marc Tracy, Three Found Guilty in N.C.A.A. Basketball Recruiting Scheme, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/24/sports/ncaa-basketball-adidas-guilty.html.
25. See CAPI, supra note 14, at 2.
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2008) (“Whoever, having devised or intending to devise
any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter,
give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or
held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme
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through their scheme of bribing the athletes and their families, as well as
concealing the payments.27 The fraud allegedly perpetrated on the universities came in two forms—(1) the risk of economic loss related to
possible NCAA sanctions and athlete ineligibility,28 and (2) the deprivation of the universities’ “right to control” the disbursement of athletic
scholarships, in restricting them to “amateurs”29 under the NCAA definition.30
Emphasizing the clandestine nature of the payments and the overall
scheme,31 the government’s narrative consisted of showing that the university suffered the deprivation of an eligible and amateur scholarship
athlete by making payments in violation of NCAA rules.32 The government argued that disclosure of the defendants’ scheme would cause the
university to refuse scholarships to the athletes in question, or as happened with Brian Bowen, revoke the athlete’s scholarship when the information became public.33
The defendants admitted to the conduct at issue, but questioned
whether such conduct was actually criminal.34 Contrary to the government’s claim that the defendants deprived the universities of amateur
athletes, the defendants argued that their scheme helped the universities
by bringing top athletes to their universities.35 Specifically, the defense
emphasized that the conduct in question would be legal if the NCAA
rules did not exist.36 Indeed, from the perspective of the defendants, they
or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail
matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits
or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private
or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or
knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the direction thereon,
or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed,
any such matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years,
or both.”).
27. See CAPI, supra note 14, at 3.
28. As discussed below, these sanctions can be quite serious economically. See infra note
51 and accompanying text.
29. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 7.
30. See CAPI, supra note 14, at 3; United States v. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d 336, 340
(S.D.N.Y. 2018).
31. The government, for instance, produced the fake invoices generated by the defendants to mask the payments. See CAPI, supra note 14, at 3.
32. See CAPI, supra note 14, at 2; Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 339.
33. See CAPI, supra note 14, at 3.
34. CAPI, supra note 14, at 3; Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 340-41.
35. See CAPI, supra note 14, at 3; Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 341.
36. Gary Parrish, Former Adidas exec on trial to claim he broke NCAA rules, not laws,
and that’s bad news for lots of college basketball teams, CBS SPORTS (Oct. 2, 2018),
https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/former-adidas-exec-on-trial-to-claimhe-broke-ncaa-rules-not-laws-and-thats-bad-news-for-lots-of-college-basketball-teams/; Dan
Greene, Closing Arguments Wrap as Jury Deliberation Awaits in Compex College Basketball
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did not commit fraud because the university gave them no benefit.37 Under the language of the statute, “there can be no ‘scheme to defraud’
where the scheme’s purpose is to benefit” the university, the alleged victim.38
Other aspects of the defendants’ arguments focused on the common
nature of such arrangements39 and the complicity of universities in such
schemes.40 The latter concept suggested that the universities had “unclean hands” in being aware of the payments, which the defendants argued, foreclosed the fraud claims.41
Following the three-week trial, the jury convicted Gatto, Code, and
Dawkins of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud.42 The Court
sentenced Gatto to nine months in prison, and Code and Dawkins to six
months each in prison.43 The Court also ordered Code and Dawkins each
to pay restitution to the University of Louisville of $28,000.44 Gatto
agreed to pay restitution to Louisville, North Carolina State, and Kansas
in the total amount of just over $342,000.45
Trial, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.si.com/college/2018/10/18/ncaacorruption-trial-closing-arguments-christian-dawkins-adidas.
37. See CAPI, supra note 14, at 3; Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 340-41.
38. See CAPI, supra note 14, at 3; Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 342; see Tracy, supra note
26. From the defendants’ perspective, the presence of the athletes on their basketball teams
would provide an economic benefit to the university, in terms of ticket sales and post-season
revenues. See CAPI, supra note 14, at 3; Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 342.
39. See CAPI, supra note 14, at 3; Nike and Under Armour, for instance, allegedly engage in similar schemes. Id.; see also Matt Vautour, Zion Williamson lawsuit: Duke, Nike and
Adidas broke NCAA benefit rules alleges former marketing agency (report), MASS LIVE (May
10, 2020), https://www.masslive.com/sports/2020/05/zion-williamson-lawsuit-duke-nikeand-adidas-broke-ncaa-benefit-rules-alleges-former-marketing-agency-report.html;
Matt
Norlander, How Maryland, Under Armour roped into investigation of Kansas recruit, CBS
SPORTS (Apr. 11, 2018, 3:47 PM), https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/howmaryland-under-armour-were-roped-into-fbi-investigation-of-kansas-recruit/.
40. See CAPI, supra note 14, at 3; Gatto, 295 F. Supp.3d at 342 (describing the participation of coaches in the scheme).
41. CAPI, supra note 14, at 3.
42. Id. at 1, 3; Emily Caron, Christian Dawkins, Jim Gatto, Merl Code Sentenced in
NCAA Basketball Corruption Trial, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 5, 2019),
https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2019/03/05/ncaa-corruption-trial-sentencing-jimgatto-christian-dawkins.
43. CAPI, supra note 14, at 1; Adam Zagoria, Here’s what latest federal sentencing
could mean for Book Richardson, Arizona’s Sean Miller, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Mar. 6, 2019),
https://tucson.com/sports/arizonawildcats/basketball/here-s-what-latest-federal-sentencingcould-mean-for-book/article_5e685ac7-69b1-55c1-824c-aa53e09f9fad.html.
44. Zagoria, supra note 43.
45. Mark Schlabach, Gatto to pay back $342K to NC State, Kansas, ESPN (Apr. 8,
2019), https://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/26473901/gatto-pay-back342k-nc-state-kansas. This amount included over $200,000 in legal fees plus the repayment
of four scholarships. Jesse Newell, Jim Gatto to pay KU about $200,000 in restitution; school
had requested $1.1 million, KANSAS CITY STAR (Apr. 8, 2019, 8:21 PM),
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B. The Assistant Coaches
In a separate trial in the spring of 2019, Code and Dawkins also
were tried for bribing assistant coaches Tony Bland of USC, Emanuel
“Book” Richardson of Arizona, and Lamont Evans of South Carolina and Oklahoma State.46 As in the first case, the jury convicted Code
and Dawkins, but not on all counts, finding that Dawkins did not bribe
Bland and Richardson.47 The court sentenced Dawkins to one year and
one day, in addition to his six-month sentence from the first case.48 Code
received a three-month sentence in addition to the six-month sentence
from his first trial.49
Rather than go to trial, the three college basketball assistant coaches
pled guilty to federal charges.50 Coach Evans pled guilty to receiving
$22,000 in bribes from handlers and was sentenced to three months in
prison.51 Coach Richardson pled guilty to one count of bribery for facilitating payments through Dawkins to Arizona players and received a
sentence of three months in prison.52 Coach Bland received two years of
probation for the receipt of a $4,000 bribe from a handler to steer an
athlete to his university.53

https://www.kansascity.com/article228995599.html; Nicole Feyh, Gatto agrees to pay restitution to KU, NC State, Louisville, 13 WIBW (Apr. 8, 2019, 7:29 PM),
https://www.wibw.com/content/news/Gatto-agrees-to-pay-KU-NC-State-Louisville508298001.html.
46. Jeff Borzello & Mark Schlabach, Dawkins, Code convicted in college hoops trial,
ESPN
(May
8,
2019),
https://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/26701792/dawkins-code-convicted-college-hoops-trial.
47. Id.
48. Jeff Borzello, Christian Dawkins sentenced for role in college basketball bribery
scandal,
ESPN
(Oct.
3,
2019),
https://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/27760964/christian-dawkins-sentenced-role-college-basketball-bribery-scandal.
49. Emily Saul, Ex-Adidas consultant Merl Code gets 3 months for NCAA scandal, N.Y.
POST (Oct. 4, 2019, 1:58 PM), https://nypost.com/2019/10/04/ex-adidas-consultant-merlcode-gets-3-months-for-ncaa-scandal/.
50. See CAPI, supra note 14, at 1; ESPN News Services, Lamont Evans pleads guilty to
bribery charge, ESPN (Jan. 30, 2019), http://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/25885440/lamont-evans-pleads-guilty-bribery-charge.
51. Associated Press, Lamont Evans sentenced, still may be deported, ESPN (June 7,
2019), https://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/26921190/lamont-evanssentenced-deported.
52. Dave Clark, Book Richardson sentenced to prison in college basketball federal bribery case, CIN. ENQUIRER (June 6, 2019, 12:54 PM), https://www.cincinnati.com/story/sports/college/othercolleges/2019/06/06/book-richardson-sentenced-prisonncaa-basketball-bribery-case/1367437001/.
53. Tim Daniels, Ex-USC Basketball Coach Tony Bland Gets 2 Years’ Probation in Bribery Scandal, BLEACHER REP. (June 5, 2019), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2839573-exusc-basketball-coach-tony-bland-to-be-sentenced-in-ncaa-bribery-scandal.
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C. Financial Advisors
Chuck Person, an Auburn assistant coach, was part of a different
kind of scheme.54 This conduct involved financial managers and advisors paying assistant coaches in return for the coaches pressuring star
college players to sign contracts with the financial managers and advisors.55 Specifically, Person received $91,500 from a Pittsburgh-based financial advisor to steer his former players to the advisor.56 The government charged this conduct as bribery, conspiracy to commit bribery,
honest services wire fraud, wire fraud, and Travel Act conspiracy.57 Person pled guilty to a single conspiracy charge and was able to avoid prison
time, receiving community service instead.58
Coach Person’s co-defendant, Rashan Michel, also pled guilty to
bribery.59 Michel had helped support and facilitate the relationship between the financial advisors, Person, and Auburn basketball players.60
Like Person, Michel was able to avoid prison time.61
III. THE THEORY OF AMATEURISM FRAUD
The amateurism fraud cases discussed above are not the first. In two
prior high-profile cases, the federal government has prosecuted individuals for fraud related to amateurism. The prior cases, as explored below,
involved agents seeking to profit and gain an advantage by circumventing NCAA rules, not realizing that their actions might have criminal consequences.

54. See CAPI, supra note 14, at 1; Arrest, supra note 22.
55. See Arrest, supra note 22.
56. See CAPI, supra note 14, at 1 n.x; Larry Neumeister, Ex-Auburn assistant coach
Chuck Person to plead guilty, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/75244cf242a548be80e691884d542202.
57. See CAPI, supra note 14, at 1; Mark Schlabach, Charges from FBI’s college corruption investigation to remain, ESPN (Jan. 3, 2019), http://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/25677971/federal-charges-college-corruption-probe-go-forward.
58. Kyle Boone, College basketball corruption trial: Ex-Auburn assistant Chuck Person
avoids prison time, CBS SPORTS (July 17, 2019, 2:36 PM), https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/college-basketball-corruption-trial-ex-auburn-assistant-chuck-personavoids-prison-time/.
59. Scott Phillips, Former NBA referee Rashan Michel accepts plea deal in third college
hoops corruption case, NBC SPORTS (May 7, 2019, 6:50 PM), https://collegebasketball.nbcsports.com/2019/05/07/former-nba-referee-rashan-michel-accepts-plea-deal-inthird-college-hoops-corruption-case/.
60. Id.
61. Associated Press, Rashan Michel avoids prison time in college basketball corruption
case,
ESPN
(Oct.
17,
2019),
https://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/27866211/rashan-michel-avoids-prison-college-basketball-corruption-case.
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Payments to prospective or current intercollegiate athletes—outside of tuition, room, board, books, and cost of attendance62—have historically violated NCAA rules.63 The economic consequences of NCAA
sanctions related to such violations can be significant, including the loss
of participation in postseason competition as well as postseason money
from bowl games and the March Madness basketball tournament.64
A. Historical Precedents
In the 1990s, the federal government charged music executive
Norby Walters, along with his partner Lloyd Bloom, with conspiracy,
RICO violations, and mail fraud65 for signing college athletes to an
agency contract prior to the completion of their eligibility.66 Walters’
initially booming business signed fifty-eight players using the enticements of cars and money, banking on his ability to recoup his investment
as their agent, receiving a commission of their pro contracts that he
would negotiate.67
To preserve athlete eligibility, Walters would post-date the contracts he signed to the date at the end of the athlete’s eligibility and
locked them in a safe.68 He also promised to lie to the universities in

62. The cost of attendance is a recent addition to this list, a result from the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
63. These rules may expand further, both in light of Alston v. NCAA (In re NCAA Ath.
Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.), 958 F.3d 1239, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 2020), recently decided
by the Ninth Circuit, which would allow payments related to education, and the NCAA’s
current move to allow remuneration from third parties for use of name, image, and likeness,
although such parameters remain unclear. See, e.g., ESPN Staff, Players getting paid? Video
games returning? Answering your NCAA name, image and likeness questions, ESPN (Apr.
29, 2020), https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/29113592/players-getting-paidvideo-games-returning-answering-your-ncaa-name-image-likeness-questions.
64. Indeed, the recent sanctions against the University of Mississippi cost its athletic department over $20 million. Nick Suss, NCAA releases verdict of Ole Miss’ probation appeal,
CLARION LEDGER (Nov. 1, 2018, 4:47 PM), https://www.clarionledger.com/story/sports/college/ole-miss/2018/11/01/ole-miss-football-learns-verdict-ncaa-sanctions/1846245002/;
SEC Staff, SEC Announces 2018-19 revenue distribution, SEC SPORTS (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.secsports.com/article/28600022/sec-announces-2018-2019-revenue-distribution.
65. Similarly worded to the statute in Gatto, the federal mail fraud statute requires a deprivation of property. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2008) (“Whoever, having devised or intending to
devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by
means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any
writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.”).
66. United States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219, 1221 (7th Cir. 1993).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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response to any inquiries so the athletes would not lose their eligibility.69
Unfortunately for Walters, fifty-six of the fifty-eight athletes he bribed
ultimately signed with other agents, even though they kept his cars and
money.70
As the court explained, the mail fraud at issue was as follows:
The fraud: causing the universities to pay scholarship funds to athletes who had become ineligible as a result of the agency contracts.
The mail: each university required its athletes to verify their eligibility to play, then sent copies by mail to conferences such as the Big
Ten.71

Under this theory, a jury convicted Walters and Bloom of mail fraud.72
The Seventh Circuit reversed based on a procedural error and required
Walters and Bloom to be tried separately.73 In exchange for the government dropping the RICO and conspiracy charges, Walters entered an Alford plea, and the Seventh Circuit reviewed the merits of the mail fraud
conviction.74
The Court again reversed and dismissed Walters’ conviction of
mail fraud, reasoning that to the degree a fraud was perpetrated, it did
not require use of the mail.75 The Court explained, “Forms verifying eligibility do not help the plan succeed; instead they create a risk that it
will be discovered if a student should tell the truth.”76 Further, “[n]o evidence demonstrates that Walters actually knew that the colleges would
mail the athletes’ forms.”77
The Seventh Circuit also explored the fraud theory later adopted by
the Second Circuit in Gatto because, on its face, Walters was not depriving the universities of any property.78 The court found that Walters may
have been incidentally causing economic damage to universities; he was
not directly receiving money from the universities, so he was not committing fraud against them.79 As the court explained, “[n]ot until today
have we dealt with a scheme in which the defendants’ profits were to

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Walters, 997 F.2d at 1221.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1221-22.
75. Id. at 1222, 1227.
76. Id. at 1222.
77. Id. at 1223.
78. Walters, 997 F.2d at 1224; see supra text accompanying note 64 (explaining the application of the fraud statute in the Gatto case).
79. Walters, 997 F.2d at 1224.
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come from legitimate transactions in the market, rather than at the expense of the victims.”80
Foreshadowing the Ninth Circuit cases in O’Bannon81 and Alston,82
the Walters court suggested that the federal statute at issue might really
be the Sherman Act and its proscription of antitrust violations, not the
mail fraud statute.83 As the court opined, “[i]nconsistent federal laws also
occur; the United States both subsidizes tobacco growers and discourages people from smoking. So if the United States simultaneously forbids cartels and forbids undermining cartels by cheating, we shall shrug
our shoulders and enforce both laws, condemning practical jokes along
the way.”84 Unfortunately for Gatto, Code, and Dawkins, the federal district courts did not share the views of the Seventh Circuit in Walters.
B. The Act of Defrauding Academia
Before going further, it is instructive to look again at the fraud alleged and convicted in the cases discussed previously. The United States
Attorneys bring these cases as violations of the federal prohibitions
against fraud, and in some cases, bribery.
The fraud statute in question, 18 U.S.C. §1341, proscribes “any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property” by
fraudulent means.85 In order to convict an individual of fraud under the
statute, the government must demonstrate that the actions of the defendant somehow defraud the victim, whether the victim is an individual or
an institution.86 In the amateurism fraud cases, the government has theorized that the actions of the defendants have defrauded one or more
universities.87
Specifically, the defendants have deprived the universities the benefit of an amateur athlete, as well as the economic consequences of the
athlete playing while ineligible and/or becoming ineligible.88 In other
words, the defendants have acted in a way in which the athlete no longer
is eligible under NCAA rules because they have paid the athlete, thus
making the athlete no longer an amateur. To be clear, the victims in these
cases under the relevant statutes are the institutions. Without the NCAA
80. Id. at 1227.
81. See supra text accompanying note 61.
82. See supra text accompanying note 62.
83. Walters, 997 F.2d at 1225.
84. Id.
85. 18 U.S.C. §1341 (2008).
86. Id.
87. Id.; United States v. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d 336, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Walters, 997
F.2d at 1221.
88. See Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 339.

232

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:61

amateurism rules, payments to prospective college athletes or current
college athletes would not constitute criminal behavior.
At its core, what the fraud claim really seems to be about here is the
right to control college athletes pursuant to the NCAA’s amateurism
scheme. Universities want the right to control athletes, at least with respect to their remuneration. Federal prosecutors have made interfering
with that control by compensating athletes, criminal.
Certainly, there may be good policy reasons for wanting to keep
third-party boosters from interfering in intercollegiate athletics, and even
further with respect to those involved in organized and now legalized
gambling. At the same time, the criminalizing of NCAA rule violations
may open the door to unforeseen consequences, dependent, of course,
on the appetite for United States attorneys to pursue such payments to
athletes.
IV. THE “CRIME” OF AMATEURISM?
In reflecting upon the decision of United States Attorneys to prosecute violations of NCAA rules as frauds perpetrated upon universities,
it begs the larger question concerning the equity and fairness of the amateurism model itself. Over sixty years ago,89 the adoption of the “student-athlete” model contemplated that athletics was an avocation that
comprised part of the education one would receive in college.90 Further,
athletics provided a way to help individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds to enjoy the experience of intercollegiate competition while
earning a college degree that otherwise might not have been a possibility.
Along the way, however, the corporatization of intercollegiate athletics, at least in the revenue sports of football and basketball in the
Power Five conferences, has literally changed the game.91 Athletic departments with $100 million budgets run a professional operation in
which athletes train on a full-time schedule in addition to their often
heavily-tutored academic pursuits.92 An epic arms race over the past

89. Jon Solomon, ‘Schooled: The Price of College Sports’ is a movie worth the NCAA
history
lesson
(review),
AL.COM
(Jan.
14,
2019),
https://www.al.com/sports/2013/10/schooled_the_price_of_college.html.
90. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 7, § 2.9.
91. See, e.g., Alston v. NCAA (In re NCAA Ath. Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.), 958
F.3d 1239, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 2020) (describing the lucrative multi-billion dollar industry of
Power Five conference intercollegiate athletics).
92. See, e.g., Peter Jacobs, Here’s The Insane Amount Of Time Student-Athletes Spend
On Practice, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 27, 2015, 8:44 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/college-student-athletes-spend-40-hours-a-week-practicing-2015-1#:~:text=Officially%2C%20the%20NCAA%20restricts%20student,or%20four%20hours%20per%20day.
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decade has led to a proliferation of elegant facilities,93 coach salaries that
dwarf those of college presidents,94 conference television networks,95
and lucrative sponsorship deals with Fortune 500 corporations and apparel companies.96 College football and college basketball are both billion-dollar enterprises. Even the non-revenue sports at the Power Five
universities enjoy the largesse and benefit of this culture, with teams often traveling extensively to compete against conference rivals hundreds
of miles away.
A. Why Universities May Not Be the Victims
From an economic vantage point, university athletic departments
profit in significant ways off of college basketball. The revenues from
the NCAA tournament each spring exceed $1 billion,97 and help make
athletic departments into financial juggernauts, at least at Power Five
conference universities. Many of these athletic departments depend on
the success of their teams both in terms of ticket sales and conference
post-season revenue to fund other non-revenue sports.
In the sport of basketball, even one superstar player can be enough
to change a team’s fortunes, both in terms of fan enthusiasm and on the
court success. The extent to which a particular player can increase revenue may be quite significant. As a result, if the third party—whether
handler, shoe executive, agent, or assistant coach—works to compensate
the athlete to play for the university, it can significantly boost the finances of the athletic department, unless the NCAA imposes sanctions
for such payments.

93. See, e.g., Jessica S. Lee, LSU’s football team has a new $28 million locker room –
complete with sleep pods, a pool, and a mini theater, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 30, 2019, 1:03 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/louisiana-state-university-football-locker-room-athletic-facility-2019-8.
94. Zach Barnett, Study: The 25 highest-paid university presidents vs. their coaches,
FOOTBALL SCOOP (May 19, 2014), https://footballscoop.com/news/salary-study-the-25-highest-paid-university-presidents-vs-their-coaches/.
95. See, e.g., SEC ESPN NETWORK, https://www.secsports.com/watch (last visited Oct.
12, 2020).
96. See, e.g., SI Wire, How Adidas, Nike and Under Armour Have Divvied Up Major
College Basketball, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.si.com/college/2017/10/02/adidas-nike-under-armour-contracts-schools-conferences.
97. See Andrew Lisa, The Money Behind the March Madness NCAA Basketball Tournament, YAHOO! FIN. (Mar. 9, 2020), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/money-behind-marchmadness-ncaa-194402803.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAKhZK1SkxEZnrCTt_ebaAwzbc1afVd-0fsMMpQQdKorG3Ms18s4hIIMTBc3dFZxEY94pbLDQ54QEqSEBW3qGiIeFASGjc1dJUUvVQNuHq4c7rw—
iZoqEdqW0cURNzWePgkkBd5G5MoaFOtcI0vVdr6umqS6PJiifQBAs0wFoL0u.
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In other words, the criminal behavior at issue—the crime of amateurism fraud—actually benefits the university unless the NCAA punishes the behavior. Unlike the federal government, however, the NCAA
lacks subpoena power. This makes enforcement cases less likely to succeed.
Ironically, the most significant benefit of all relates to the public
relations side of college athletics.98 As state universities become increasingly dependent on tuition revenue in light of depressed state legislative
higher education contributions, athletics serves as a consistent advertisement for the institution, with athletics success correlating in many cases
to admissions success and increases in enrollment.99
Certainly, it might offend one’s sensibilities to the extent one buys
the amateurism rhetoric of the NCAA. But as discussed below, the
NCAA continues to move further and further away from the concept of
amateurism. Indeed, it seems to be drawing the line now at pay from the
institution to the athlete, even though the athlete already receives tens of
thousands of dollars annually in the form of tuition, room, board, books,
and cost of attendance, plus whatever other educational compensation
becomes mandated by the Alston case.
B. Why Athletes Might Be
Unlike the corporate nature of Power Five conference intercollegiate athletics, many revenue sport athletes “live below the poverty
line.”100 In basketball, these athletes generate over $1 billion annually
from the March Madness tournament alone. While the amateurism benefits of tuition, room, board, books, and cost of attendance are significant, as is the opportunity for an education, much of the revenue generated by these athletes does not flow to them. The coaches, the facilities,
the non-revenue sport athletes all receive money generated by the college football and basketball players.
The amounts criminalized in the Walters and Gatto cases were
$100,000 or less per athlete, and in most cases, much less. Counting payments to poor individuals as fraudulent behavior—depriving a large institution with significant resources of their amateurism—does not seem
to align with the economic realities in place. In essence, payments by
98. See generally KRISTI DOSH, SATURDAY MILLIONAIRES: HOW WINNING FOOTBALL
BUILDS WINNING COLLEGES (2013).
99. See Michael Mitchell, Michael Leachman & Kathleen Masterson, Funding Down,
Tuition Up, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/funding-down-tuition-up.
100. Devon Greene, It’s time to pay college athletes, WESTERN COURIER (Mar. 7, 2018),
https://westerncourier.com/40606/sports/its-time-to-pay-college-athletes/.
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third parties in excess of the salary cap imposed by a cartel constitute
criminal fraud, despite the possibility that the cartel itself violates federal
antitrust law.
At its core, this issue is more about control than anything. While an
initial impulse of the NCAA and its member institutions may have related to a desire to limit the cost of its workforce—the athletes generating
the revenue and goodwill—the more imminent concern is the ability to
control the economic landscape. As discussed below, the NCAA seems
to be working at all costs to preserve the billion-dollar golden goose of
March Madness.
The lack of control, even more than the economic limitations on
college athletes, seems to be where the athletes can appear to be more a
victim of the crime of amateurism. The deprivation of the right to participate in the marketplace, whether through individual sale of one’s
name, image, and likeness, or through a collectively bargained system
of educational conditions, ultimately might be the cost of this criminalization of third party payments.
The ironic consequence of Gatto and the other cases described
above, is a shift away from amateurism. This “indentured servant” type
arrangement—with “amateur” intercollegiate athletics being the predominant path to a career in professional sports—may be facing extinction.
V. POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF AMATEURISM FRAUD
Before exploring the longer-term implications of amateurism fraud,
it is instructive to examine the immediate, near-term consequences. In
light of the convictions of Gatto, Code, and Dawkins, the question now
becomes whether there might be broader consequences to these successful prosecutions. This section explores a number of possible consequences related to broadening the scope of criminality under the federal
fraud law, possible limits on such prosecutions, and related consequences for university compliance departments.
A. Broadening the Scope of Criminality
To date, the defendants in the federal fraud cases have been agents,
runners, shoe executives, and assistant coaches. Under the fraud theory
explained above, though, a much broader group of individuals might also
fall under the statute. If the fraud at issue is depriving a university of an
amateur athlete by acting in a way that undermines the athlete’s amateur
status, then anyone violating NCAA rules in such a way as to make the
athlete ineligible—for receiving proscribed economic benefits—might
be guilty of fraud.
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1. Boosters
The obvious category of individuals that United States attorneys
could prospectively target is university boosters. Under the NCAA definition, a booster is anyone that supports a university’s athletic team.101
And the NCAA rules clearly proscribe providing athletes with impermissible benefits.102
Read expansively, the fraud statutes can encompass behavior by
boosters in providing benefits—anything more than de minimis compensation. This is because such behavior can threaten the eligibility of a college athlete and thus defraud the university of an amateur.
Given the volume of NCAA infractions self-reported annually,103 a
cottage industry could emerge for prosecutors. On one hand, this approach might bolster efforts to remove third-party booster payments
from college athletics in a way that the NCAA enforcement committee
could never achieve. Armed with subpoena power, federal prosecutors
could conduct their own war on money in college athletics akin to the
thirty-year war on drugs started in the Reagan era.104
The influence of the prosecutors could also help reduce the economic cost of university compliance departments armed with the impossible task of monitoring all of the behavior surrounding its hundreds of
athletes. The economic savings there alone might support the fraud theory advanced in the amateurism fraud cases.105
2. Coaches
Coaches would also be obvious targets of such investigations. The
extent to which federal prosecutors actively continue such prosecutions
101. Role of Boosters, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/enforcement/role-boosters (last visited Oct. 10, 2020); see also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 7, § 6.4.2 (explaining the institution’s responsibility for the behavior of third-party boosters).
102. See, e.g., Role of Boosters, supra note 101; NCAA MANUAL, supra note 7, § 16.02.3
(defining impermissible benefits); NCAA MANUAL, supra note 7, § 12.01 (explaining the
concept of amateurism).
103. This is a common practice. See, e.g., Andy Anders, Ineligibility And Personalized
Itineraries: Ohio State’s Self-Reported NCAA Violations From January Through September
2019, LANTERN (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.thelantern.com/2020/01/ineligibility-and-personalized-itineraries-ohio-states-self-reported-ncaa-violations-from-january-through-october-2019/; Charlie Potter, University of Alabama self-reports six minor NCAA violations,
247SPORTS (July 2, 2020, 5:20 PM), https://247sports.com/college/alabama/Article/AlabamaCrimson-Tide-Athletics-self-reports-six-minor-NCAA-violations-for-2019-20-148774290/.
104. Of course, this could have drastically negative consequences. See, e.g., MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN AN AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS
(2010).
105. See,
e.g.,
Finances
of
Intercollegiate
Athletics,
NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/finances-intercollegiate-athletics (last visited
Oct. 10, 2020) (exploring the costs of intercollegiate athletics).
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could alter the risks related to college coaching. No longer is cheating
merely risking a show cause order from the NCAA, it also would be
risking criminal liability.
An important caveat here related to coach criminal liability is worth
noting. All of the assistant coaches involved in the prosecuted cases received money from third parties. Interestingly, the first round of cases
filed by the prosecutors in the Southern District of New York did not
target any head coaches. This was despite clear evidence of head coaches
at Kansas, Arizona, and LSU allegedly having information about and
perhaps even participating in the payments from third parties to their
players.106 It is possible the prosecutors distinguished between receiving
bribes and facilitating them.
It seems possible that a coach could commit fraud against his employer by depriving the university of an amateur athlete; it is not clear
why his position would necessarily differentiate him from third parties
like runners or agents. At the same time, such a prosecution might raise
the same kinds of issues that led the Seventh Circuit to reverse Walters’
conviction.
The economic benefit, or property, that a coach would be receiving
would be the benefit of the athlete playing and the team winning. This
“profit” would be the indirect benefit of a new contract or meeting contractual incentives based on wins and team performance. As with the
Walters case, it is not clear that the success of the team would injure the
university. To the contrary, it might benefit it. This of course assumes
that the NCAA does not catch the coach arranging for payment for the
player.
B. Limits on Prosecution
Even so, a rush to prosecute boosters and coaches seems unlikely.
The optics of these prosecutions certainly enter into the calculus of resource allocation. The public reputation of runners, handlers, and individuals inhabiting the AAU basketball culture does not endear such figures to the public. The decisions of the juries in the cases of Code and
Dawkins might indicate as much. Even shoe executives like Gatto can
be portrayed as predators worth punishing.
Exuberant fans—the average boosters—do not fall into this category. The big money donors might rise to this level, but probably do not
106. See Billy Witz, Who’s on Trial in the College Basketball Scandal? Not the Big
Names, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/sports/collegebasketball-trial-arizona-lsu.html; Dave Skretta, NCAA calls alleged Kansas basketball violations ‘egregious,’ STAR TRIB. (May 11, 2020, 9:43 AM), https://www.startribune.com/ncaacalls-alleged-kansas-basketball-violations-egregious/570286972/.
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rest so high on the hierarchy of possible criminals worth federal government prosecutorial resources. In addition, the growing public view that
college athletes should receive compensation for playing sports also suggests that the public may be less than supportive of a war against boosters.
A similar sentiment would likely exist with respect to head coaches.
Fans care most about whether a coach wins. It is reasonable to think that
fan dismay with NCAA sanctions is less about the coach involved and
more about the negative impact on the team. In the minds of many, cheating may be unacceptable, but is likely not criminal.
Further, these cases do not lead to lengthy prison sentences. The
longest sentence to date is Dawkins’ one year and one day. As a result,
the crime of amateurism fraud does not seem to be one worth resources
beyond that expended by the Southern District of New York.
C. NCAA Compliance
The NCAA Committee on Infractions lacks subpoena power. In
other words, the Committee is unable to make individuals testify in cases
related to potential NCAA rules violations. As a result, the NCAA and
the Committee have established the self-reporting principle.107 Under
this principle, university athletic departments have a responsibility of
self-reporting rules violations, and report on a regular basis to the conferences and the NCAA.108
To the extent that rules violations threaten athlete eligibility, those
violations constitute acts of criminal fraud, even if the likelihood of prosecution is low. As a result, other considerations previously not relevant
may become more important. The compliance office of a university
might find itself caught between the reporting requirement of the NCAA
and the knowledge that it is reporting criminal activity if it discloses impermissible benefits. When the individual providing the benefit is an employee, the university may not want to report the behavior, particularly
if the individual is a coach. With the exception of sexual assault, the
institution does not necessarily have a duty to report criminal behavior
of its employees.
Where the provider of the impermissible benefit is a booster, the
university similarly might not want to report the behavior for similar reasons. As universities increasingly depend on alumni contributions,
107. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 7, § 19.2.2.
108. See, e.g., TEX. A&M U.—KINGSVILLE, COMPLIANCE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
MANUAL
7-8
(2012),
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/C_TAMUK_ComplianceManual.pdf; see also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 7, § 6.4
(explaining the institution’s responsibility for the behavior of third-party boosters).
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institutions will not be eager to turn over their alumni to federal prosecutors for committing amateurism fraud in the name of helping the team
win.
Even if a university has no issue with releasing such information,
the possibility of criminal liability could cut strongly against the culture
of self-reporting the NCAA compliance scheme depends upon to regulate institutions. The aggravator in compliance cases—the lack of institutional control—often results from a failure to disclose cheating before
the enforcement division of the NCAA discovers it.109 The incentive to
disclose potentially could diminish where the consequence is a felony
conviction for an employee of the university or a friend of the institution.
These considerations may seem to lie at the lower end of the risk
spectrum. As one prosecutor in the Southern District of New York has
demonstrated, however, it only takes one motivated prosecutor to make
the considerations raised herein a set of serious challenges for compliance departments.
VI. THE IRONIC SYSTEMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE AMATEURISM
FRAUD CASES
Viewing these cases from a global perspective, one might expect
that criminalizing violations of the NCAA’s amateurism rules would
have the effect of strengthening them. Prosecuting third-party payments
to college athletes in the name of protecting the right of the university to
amateur athletes and restoring the power of institutions to frame the student-athlete paradigm, in theory, advances the cause of the NCAA. By
marshaling resources, including subpoena power, that the NCAA lacks,
the federal prosecutors would seem to be serving as the cavalry needed
to curb bribery and fraud. The consequence has been, and will continue
to be, the exact opposite.
A. Diminishing Amateurism
The effect of the prosecutions by the Southern District of New York
has been to diminish amateurism, at least the NCAA’s version of it. To
understand why, one must begin by looking at the NCAA itself.
The March Madness basketball tournament that generates over $1
billion annually provides almost all of the NCAA’s revenue. As such,
the NCAA must protect the tournament and its revenue at all costs. The
effect of the prosecutions publicly was to threaten the NCAA in creating
a clear association between college basketball and criminality.

109. See Role of Boosters, supra note 101.
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The consequence of this association should it become ensconced in
the public consciousness is not merely the risk that it poses to attendance,
but also to viewership. The high television ratings of the tournament110
certainly contribute to the desire of companies to spend large amounts
of money on advertising. The corporate sponsors, in effect, fund the entire NCAA through the revenue provided to the tournament. These companies benefit not only from the effectiveness of the advertising to large
audiences that then purchase their products, but also by the positive association they have with the tournament. In light of all of these intersecting interests, the image of the tournament and the NCAA remains intimately tied to their future success.
The immediate reaction of the NCAA to the announcement of the
indictments reflected this reality. The NCAA took action in the fall of
2017 subsequent to the September 2017 announcement of the indictments by installing the Commission on College Basketball.111 Condoleezza Rice, the widely-respected former Stanford provost and Secretary of State, headed the Commission, which was charged with
proposing changes to remedy the problems with college basketball exposed by the indictments.112
As the NCAA rules served as the basis for what made the payments
to college basketball players criminal, the Commission, whether consciously or not, proposed a number of reforms that softened the amateurism rules.113 The NCAA has adopted many of their proposals to date.114
The three-pronged approach of the Commission focused on (1) basketball, (2) accountability, and (3) outside voices.115 The first pillar
sought to increase “freedom and flexibility” of athletes while
110. Steven Impey, NCAA March Madness ratings second highest in 29 years,
SPORTSPRO (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.sportspromedia.com/news/ncaa-march-madnessratings-second-highest.
111. See Committed to Change, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/committed-change
(last visited Oct. 10, 2020).
112. Condoleezza Rice, STAN. U., https://politicalscience.stanford.edu/people/condoleezza-rice (last visited Oct. 10, 2020); Matt Norlander, Mark Emmert picks Condoleezza
Rice to lead new committee to fix NCAA basketball, CBS SPORTS (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/mark-emmert-picks-condoleezza-riceto-lead-new-committee-to-fix-ncaa-basketball/.
113. See generally COMM’N ON COLLEGE BASKETBALL, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES FACING COLLEGIATE BASKETBALL (2018)
[hereinafter COMM’N ON COLLEGE BASKETBALL], https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2018CCBReportFinal_web_20180501.pdf.
114. See Committed to Change, supra note 111; see also Associated Press, NCAA adopts
college basketball reforms for NBA draft, agents, more, NBC SPORTS PHILA. (Aug. 8, 2018),
https://www.nbcsports.com/philadelphia/ncaa/ncaa-adopts-college-basketball-reforms-nbadraft-agents-more.
115. Committed to Change, supra note 111.
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“minimiz[ing] the leverage of harmful outside influences.”116 The increasing of the freedom and flexibility led to the changing of the no-draft
and no-agent rules.117 College basketball players would be allowed to
have agents, as well as enter the NBA draft and return to college if not
drafted.118 These changes were significant departures from the prior
NCAA approach. Hiring an agent was the sin that Walters committed by
signing players that led to the ineligibility of athletes and allegations of
mail fraud. Once an athlete hired an agent, the NCAA’s long-held view
was that the athlete had abandoned his or her amateur status by entering
into an agent contract.119 Similarly, entering the draft was a clear sign
that the athlete had irrevocably crossed the line from amateur to professional, from eligible to ineligible.120 The NCAA had allowed athletes to
declare for the draft and engage in pre-draft evaluations, but the athlete
had to announce a return to college prior to the actual draft.121
While the draft rule change clearly added flexibility, it is not clear
that allowing agents to sign college basketball players while in high
school constitutes a way to minimize harmful outside influences. Christian Dawkins, to the extent he can be considered a criminal influence,
would now be able to sign players prior to college. The NCAA is making
efforts to regulate both the individuals who can serve as agents through
this process, as well as limit the ability to sign with an agent to a subsection of elite players, but it still is a significant shift from its former “amateurism” position.
Another recommendation of the Commission, albeit outside the
NCAA’s power, would be to eliminate the NBA’s one-and-done rule.122
The NBA is considering returning to its former approach of allowing
116. Id.
117. Id. (Flexibility For Going Pro And Getting a Degree). The Seventh Circuit previously
denied antitrust challenges to these rules. See Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1082 (7th Cir.
1992).
118. Committed to Change, supra note 111 (Flexibility For Going Pro And Getting A
Degree). University of Virginia star Mamadi Diakite was a beneficiary of this rule. Paul Kasabian, Mamadi Diakite Returning to Virginia After Declaring for 2019 NBA Draft, BLEACHER
REP. (May 29, 2019), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2838621-report-mamadi-diakite-returning-to-virginia-after-declaring-for-2019-nba-draft.
119. Marc Tracy, N.C.A.A. Alters Rules for Agents and Draft in Wake of Basketball Corruption
Scandal,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
8,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/08/sports/ncaa-basketball-agents.html.
120. Id.
121. Tyler Conway, NCAA Proposes New Rule to Allow Early NBA Draft Entrants to
Return to School, BLEACHER REP. (June 24, 2015), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2505462-ncaa-proposes-new-rule-to-allow-early-nba-draft-entrants-to-return-to-school.
122. Tough talk on corruption, one-and-done, but commission misses the mark, ESPN
(Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/23304802/condoleezza-rice-commission-recommendations-one-done-nba-draft-corruption-recruiting.
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high school athletes to enter the draft.123 Part of the idea would be to
eliminate players that might be more susceptible to taking cash payments
because they had no real interest in NCAA basketball.
The NBA’s investment in the G League also complicates the picture, as it may now offer a real alternative to the NCAA as a path to the
NBA.124 The NCAA is open to the success of such an alternative so long
as it does not diminish the talent pool in such a way as to undermine
March Madness. The NCAA’s gamble, though, is that the attraction of
fans to the tournament rests more in the competitiveness of the games,
the buzzer beater outcomes, and the unpredictability, including upsets
by underdog teams. Eliminating a few elite players could actually enhance these goals; eliminating a large class of quality players could have
a more dramatic negative effect.
The second pillar of the Commission, accountability, related to
more strict compliance enforcement with a more efficient process that
sets stronger penalties.125 The suspension of Memphis star James Wiseman for moving expenses received while in high school126 was a step in
this direction, but it is not clear what the ultimate goal is, as others involved in the cases above, including the head coaches at Arizona and
Kansas, have, to date, avoided any penalty despite ongoing investigations. To be sure, the NCAA’s compliance enforcement remains a lightning rod for criticism such that its goals reflect overall perception rather
than efficient, equal-handed justice. On the other hand, the lack of subpoena power is a key impediment in this context.
The third pillar of including outside voices also was achieved by
the diversity of the Commission, which included a wide range of people.127 The NCAA also wants to reduce what it perceives as corruption
by expanding downward to create its own alternative to AAU basketball.128 The idea here is to influence the culture of runners by offering a
regulated path from middle school to March Madness. By participating
in the business of basketball extended downward, the NCAA is in a way
123. Khadrice Rollins, Adam Silver Expects One-and-Done Rule to End in Time for 2022
Draft, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 12, 2019), https://www.si.com/nba/2019/05/12/adam-silver-end-one-and-dones-2022-draft.
124. Id.; What You Need to Know About the NBA G League, NBA G LEAGUE,
https://gleague.nba.com/about/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
125. Committed to Change, supra note 111.
126. Billy Witz, James Wiseman of Memphis Can Return From Suspension in January,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/20/sports/ncaabasketball/james-wiseman-of-memphis-can-return-from-suspension-in-january.html.
127. Committed to Change, supra note 111.
128. See, e.g., Ricky O’Donnell, The NCAA is trying to destroy AAU basketball,
SBNATION (June 26, 2018, 11:01 AM), https://www.sbnation.com/college-basketball/2018/6/26/17501458/aau-changes-college-basketball-fbi-investigation.
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professionalizing lower levels of basketball, another step away from amateurism.
B. Name, Image, and Likeness?
The other significant recommendation of the Commission in this
regard is to allow college athletes the ability to profit off of the uses of
their names, images, and likenesses (NILs).129 The O’Bannon case had
provided the first meaningful attack on this restriction, but the NCAA
had not yielded in response.130 The Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon found that
the NCAA’s cartel violated the Sherman Act, but that violation did not
entitle college athletes to use of their NILs.131
The Commission, which again was a direct response to the amateurism fraud cases detailed above, recommended this change. Unlike
some of the other recommendations, the NCAA did not immediately implement the freedom to use NILs; its stated reason for waiting was the
pending Alston case,132 which the Ninth Circuit recently decided.133
While it may have been inevitable, there is no question that the cases
filed by the Southern District of New York kept the issue of NIL in the
public discourse after O’Bannon was decided in 2015.
State legislatures, however, have essentially forced the NCAA’s
hand on this issue. In the fall of 2019, the California legislature passed a
law entitling all college athletes the right to use their NILs, and prohibited institutions from punishing such uses with a loss of eligibility.134
The California law goes into effect in 2023.135 Initially, the NCAA stated
its opposition to the California statute, and suggested it might sue to enjoin the law on grounds that it is unconstitutional.136
Other states followed suit, with a wide variety of proposals in state
legislatures related to NIL as well as possible compensation for college
129. COMM’N ON COLLEGE BASKETBALL, supra note 113, at 38.
130. There have been other challenges to the NCAA’s amateurism rules as well, see supra
note 6, but O’Bannon made the first inroads on name, image, and likeness. O’Bannon v.
NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
131. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079.
132. COMM’N ON COLLEGE BASKETBALL, supra note 113, at 37-38.
133. Alston v. NCAA (In re NCAA Ath. Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.), 958 F.3d
1239, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 2020) (upholding an injunction restricting the ability of the NCAA to
block expenses for “education-related benefits”).
134. Michael McCann, What’s Next After California Signs Game Changer Fair Pay to
Play Act Into Law?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/09/30/fair-pay-to-play-act-law-ncaa-california-pac-12#.
135. Id.
136. Editorial Board, California is making the NCAA extremely angry. Good., WASH.
POST (Oct. 3, 2019, 4:02 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/california-is-making-the-ncaa-extremely-angry-good/2019/10/03/20321534-e606-11e9-a6e88759c5c7f608_story.html.
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athletes.137 In October 2019, the NCAA decided it was a better idea to
make its own rule first, at the very least to avoid what it deemed as the
daunting proposition of complying with fifty different state laws on the
issue.138
In April 2020, the NCAA announced that it would allow NILs with
respect to all college athletes, as long as the universities did not play any
role in interacting with third parties to secure such endorsements or remuneration.139 Part of the worry is to prevent direct payments from
boosters through athletic departments to athletes.
In addition, athletes can use their identity as an athlete, but cannot
use logos or intellectual property of their university.140 The NCAA has
charged the respective divisions of its member institutions to develop
additional rules—guardrails—to protect against abuse by third parties.141
The plan is to develop these rules during the fall of 2020, and vote on
them in January 2021, so that they go into effect for the 2021-22 academic year.142
The move to allow NIL compensation cuts against the NCAA’s traditional view of amateurism in deep and profound ways. So much of its
compliance rules have focused on preventing third parties from giving
benefits to athletes. Now such behavior will be acceptable on some level.
Indeed, it will be interesting to determine how the NCAA and its
member institutions will distinguish between endorsements, which will
be permissible, and third-party payments, which will presumably still
violate the principle of amateurism. The NCAA has made clear that the
universities may not pay athletes directly under this new scheme, but
drawing lines beyond that seems to be quite challenging.
One likely result of this move will be an increase in power for the
conferences. As more money enters into intercollegiate athletics from
external sources, the interests of the NCAA institutions, between the
137. Charlotte Carroll, Tracking NCAA Fair Play Legislation Across the Country, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/10/02/tracking-ncaa-fairplay-image-likeness-laws.
138. Press Release, NCAA, Board of Governors starts process to enhance name, image
and likeness opportunities (Oct. 29, 2019), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/board-governors-starts-process-enhance-name-image-and-likeness-opportunities.
139. Press Release, NCAA, Board of Governors moves toward allowing student-athlete
compensation
for
endorsements
and
promotions
(Apr.
29,
2020),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/board-governors-moves-toward-allowing-student-athlete-compensation-endorsements-and-promotions.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Zac Al-Khateeb, NCAA NIL rules, explained: What recommended updates mean for
student-athletes, and what comes next, SPORTINGNEWS (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.sportingnews.com/us/ncaa-football/news/ncaa-nil-rules-updates-explained-student-athletes/118otm673eogy1mmrl0q7f4ycv.
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sixty or so schools in the Power Five conferences and the hundreds that
are not, could threaten the existence of the NCAA itself. The basketball
tournament, and the need to include hundreds of schools as potential participants, seems to be the only glue currently holding the NCAA together.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the concept of the crime of amateurism—
third parties committing fraud against universities by paying intercollegiate athletes and depriving universities of amateur athletes. After describing the recent proliferation of cases out of the Southern District of
New York, the Article questioned the efficacy of the theory in its possible overstating of the damage suffered by universities and its potential
collateral consequences for college athletes.
The Article next explored the immediate consequences of these
cases, including a broader scope of criminality for boosters and coaches,
the likelihood of further prosecutions, and the possible impact on compliance departments.
The Article then moved to its core claim—that the consequence of
criminalizing amateurism has ironically been to diminish the concept of
amateurism significantly, and move the NCAA in a direction toward extinction. It is clear that the concept of amateurism continues to shift; it
remains to be seen whether the NCAA can restructure it in a way that
will preserve its role in intercollegiate athletics.

